ISSN 2413-5372, Certificate of state re-registration of КВ №25381-15321 ПР dated 01.07.2023.

Search

SCIENTIFIC - PRACTICAL JOURNAL "HERALD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE"

The influence of «prisoner`s dilemma» for concluding an agreement on the recognition of guilt in criminal proceedings

The influence of «prisoner`s dilemma» for concluding an agreement on the recognition of guilt in criminal proceedings

Pages: 26-36
Year: 2019
Location: Pravova Ednist Ltd

Review

Prisoner`s dilemma is a classic game theory dilemma. The theory of games, as a theory of mathematical models for making optimal solutions in a conflict situation, can find solutions to the most complex theoretical issues with the appropriate probability and mathematical accuracy. In the classic dilemma of prisoner the maximal winning is examined one suspected in relation to other and different types of collaboration. The cooperation of suspects with the investigation and cooperation between suspects for the benefit of the investigation is considered. In the procedural sense, the game theory can decide on the conclusion of an agreement on the recognition of guilt. Mathematical models can address not only the issue of quantitative indicators and statistics on the use of guilty plea bargaining agreements, but these models can help in making optimal decisions by the parties to criminal proceedings in concluding agreements on the recognition of guilty in practice. An agreement on the recognition of guilt between a prosecutor and a suspect or accused occupies a special place in a criminal proceeding. Applying the theory of games to make optimal decisions in criminal proceedings can achieve the desired result under appropriate conditions. Such a result is mathematically defined. Each decision in a criminal proceeding is taken under appropriate conditions, which increases the probability of an onset of the predicted result. Mathematical models mediated influence on judicial interests of parties of criminal realization. Competing, parties will develop optimal strategies for the achievement of maximally advantageous judicial results. The consequence of such strategies can be made agreement about confession of guiltiness. The conclusion of an agreement on the recognition of guilt can be a viable option for all parties to criminal proceedings, and understanding the prisoner's dilemmas from the point of view of game theory can improve the efficiency of the conclusion of such transactions. A prisoner's dilemma mathematically defines the fact that, according to prison conditions defined in the dilemma, the cooperation of suspects with the investigation clearly dominates the silence of the suspects. The matrix of prison dilemma involves four variants of events. The probability of concluding an agreement on the recognition of guilt under specified conditions is 75%. According to Pareto, concluding an agreement on the recognition of guilt increases the effectiveness of the pre-trial investigation in the proportion of 20/80. 20% of the investigation efforts lead to 80% of the procedural outcome in the form of an agreement on the recognition of guilt.

Key words: prisoner dilemma, game theory, mathematical models in criminal proceedings, optimal solutions and strategy of parties in criminal proceedings, cooperation with investigation, probability of concluding an agreement on recognition of guilty, efficiency of procedural economy by Pareto principle. 

The influence of «prisoner`s dilemma» for concluding an agreement on the recognition of guilt in criminal proceedings