Review

The article is devoted to the research the origins of the standard of proof «beyond reasonable doubt» in criminal proceeding. Based on the analysis of legal, philosophical, ethical literature and mathematical logic the essence of the given expression which is applied in our time in the form of a

standard of proof «beyond reasonable doubt» was defined.

The article examines the main vectors of the development of the criminal-procedural category of

«reasonable doubt» and the application of the standard of proof «beyond reasonable doubt» by the

judicial authorities.

On the basis of analysis of key influential works main historical vectors of development and interpretation of «beyond a reasonable doubt» standard were unfolded: rational (as a mean to overcome uncertainty) and theological (as a mean to overcome «burden of sentencing»).

It is justified that the standard of proof «beyond a reasonable doubt» doesn’t conflict with the concept of «inner conviction,» but makes its psychological aspects more formal by answering the question on sufficiency of present evidence in order to make a criminal procedural decision. It is asserted that all criminal procedural court decisions are probabilistic in nature and thus inevitableness of judicial errors. These judicial errors may be distributed by setting «beyond a reasonable doubt» standard.

The standard of proof «beyond reasonable doubt» was first mentioned in the courts of 1770, in the course of court proceedings concerning the «Boston massacre». Formation of the definition of «reasonable doubt» occurred at the end of the 19th century in the decisions of American courts.

The standard of proof «beyond reasonable doubt» is a complex multidimensional category with interesting history. This standard does not have a clear wording, but rules of logic help to understand and interpret it correctly.

References

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